




HEI Working Paper No: 06/2007 
 
The Economics of Fair Trade Coffee: 
For Whose Benefit? 
An Investigation into the Limits of Fair Trade as a 




Graduate Institute of International Studies 
 
Abstract 
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regression is used to correct for a sample self-selection bias and to check if there is some support 
for the claim that supermarkets that have started to sell fair trade coffee are clean-washing their 
reputation in the fair trade business. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the last 15 years, the world of coffee has been experiencing what some authors call the 
“coffee paradox”
2. The price of coffee is progressively sinking and millions of producers are 
undergoing a deep “crisis”. This is deteriorating their social fabric as well as the environment 
they are living in. At the same time, developed markets are “booming”, with consumers paying 
higher prices for more and more differentiated products. This is benefiting intermediary actors 
like traders, roasters and retailers who earn higher profits. 
 
The sharpening of these trends happens to coincide with the break down of the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989, which defined a price band and put in place a system of quotas 
and buffer stocks guaranteeing a relative stability of prices and traded quantities. Liberalization 
of the coffee market has brought about many problems in producing countries, but the pressure 
that has arisen at the domestic and international level makes states incapable or unwilling to use 
market  regulation  as  a  tool  to  answer  these  problems.  This  political  deficit  has  generated 
asymmetric benefits among private actors along the coffee value chain. It has also led to the 
involvement of new actors and to the development of new mechanisms to deal with the negative 
effects of this evolution. 
 
Alternative  trade,  which  aims  at  creating  new  distribution  channels  to  near  producers  and 
consumers and to pay producers a price that enables them to live in dignity, has existed for a long 
time at an artisanal scale. Its development into fair trade is coincidental with the deepening of the 
coffee crisis. Complementarily to alternative trade, fair trade tries to use existing mainstream 
channels to distribute labeled coffee. The objective is to reach out to ordinary consumers, to 
enlarge the demand for coffee produced in sustainable social and environmental conditions. 
 
There are several ways to try to assess the relevance and the potential of this initiative as an 
answer to the coffee crisis. The second section of this paper will expose some important facts 
about the coffee world. Before proposing a remedy, it is important to know the scale and depth of 
the coffee crisis, how the industry is structured and what has been so far proposed to explain the 
                                                 
2 Title of the book of Daviron, B., Ponte, S. (2006)  
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coffee  paradox.  The  third  section  exposes  the  fair  trade  system:  its  origin,  the  existing 
organizations  and  the  structure  of  FairTrade  Labelling  Organization  International  (FLO)  in 
particular.  A  brief  comparison  with  other  existing  private  labeling  initiatives  illustrates  how 
labels have become part of marketing strategies aiming at projecting a positive image of coffee 
brands. It also shows FairTrade is the most generous and ambitious one.  
 
To the question “Who benefits from fair trade?” the answer of fair trade organizations is “The 
FairTrade system provides tangible benefits to small-scale farmers and workers, consumers and 
the environment.”
3 Section four of this paper tackles this question from a different perspective. It 
first gives an overview of benefits to producers who are involved in the fair trade network, and of 
the limits of these benefits. Overall financial benefits are estimated as well as the number of 
producers concerned and the additional per capita income generated by fair trade coffee. It then 
focuses on the benefits to the new intermediaries that are fair trade organizations. The last part of 
section four contains an analysis of benefits to retailers. Since there is no available information 
about margins retailers take on fair trade products, a financial analysis of their benefits is not 
possible. It is however possible to estimate the beneficial effects on the reputation of actors who 
distribute fair trade products. 
 
Two hypotheses will be tested at that stage: first, the claim that consumer awareness can make a 
difference; second, the hypothesis supermarkets are clean-washing their hands in the fair trade 
business. Clean-washing is defined as misleading consumers by using fair trade as a marketing 
tool to upgrade one’s image as a responsible and socially concerned stakeholder. If supermarkets 
claim to help poor producers through consumer awareness raising knowing consumer awareness 
raising does not help poor producers, the behaviour of supermarkets only amounts to, first, raise 
consumer awareness that supermarkets distribute Fairtrade products and, second, strengthen the 
illusion they are doing something to help poor producers.  
 
Based on the results of the previous sections, the conclusion discusses the danger of the hope fair 
trade is conveying and the intellectual trap parts of the movement are caught in, which consists of 
believing that private initiatives can be a solution to systemic problems. 
                                                 
3 FAQ of FLO website  
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2. SOME FACTS ABOUT THE WORLD OF COFFEE
4 
 
The story of coffee started in the Horn of Africa, in the Ethiopian province of Kaffa, where the 
first coffee tree probably appeared. There are many legends surrounding the discovery of the 
properties of coffee beans. What can historically be attested is coffee beans used to be chewed by 
African slaves brought to Arab countries and coffee has been cultivated in Yemen at least since 
the 15
th century. Mocha, one of the most important ports at that time and now synonymous with 
coffee, is one of the first cities where coffeehouses appeared. Coffeehouses rapidly became a 
widespread  entertainment  place  throughout  the  Arab  world,  where  people  played  chess  and 
discussed politics. 
 
Venetian traders first brought coffee to Europe in 1615, almost one century after hot chocolate 
had  started  to  become  fashionable  and  only  five  years  after  tea  was  first  sold  in  Europe. 
Europeans then started to cultivate coffee in their freshly acquired colonies. At the end of the 17
th 
century, the Dutch started to grow coffee in India and in Java. Twenty years later, French, Dutch 
and British sailors brought coffee to the Caribbean islands and to Surinam from where it reached 
South and Central America. In 1825 coffee culture started in Hawaii. In two centuries, coffee had 
spread around the whole world. 
 
Coffee  trade  has  grown  since  then  to  become  the  second  or  third  largest  commodity  traded 
internationally, mainly on the markets of London (London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange or LIFFE) and New York (Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange or CSCE, 
which  is  a  part  of  the  New  York  Board  of Trade  or  NYBOT). It  has  been  a  major  foreign 
exchange earner in many developing countries and some countries still rely on coffee for up to 
80% of their export revenues. Trade patterns have evolved over time traditionally benefiting big 
exporters like Brazil, Columbia and now Vietnam. From 1957 to 1989 the coffee market was 
regulated by the ICA, which regrouped both exporting and importing countries. The instability 
generated by its fall is affecting more than 25 millions producers who depend on coffee for their 
income. Around 125 millions people are indirectly concerned. 
                                                 
4 More detailed information about the history can be found on the website of the ICO 
(www.ico.com) or in the second chapter of Daviron, B., Ponte, S. (2006)  
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2.1. The coffee crisis 
 
After the Second World War the international community thought about the creation of a series 
of  intergovernmental  institutions  able  to  protect  and  develop  the  multilateral  trading  system, 
which had collapsed in the 1930’s. The IMF was created, but the projects of an International 
Trade Organization and of an International Commodity Stabilization Fund were dropped. The 
IBRD was of course set up, but it lacked resources. It is the Marshall Plan, which contributed to 
the  reconstruction  of  war-torn  Europe.  Interests  of  developing  countries,  most  of  them  still 
colonies at the time, were left aside at the Bretton Woods Conference.
5 
 
Coffee is the only commodity for which a multilateral framework could be set up. The ICA lasted 
for 32 years, but collapsed under the growing pressure for liberalization and under the problems 
of  free-riding  generated  by  members  overselling  their  quotas.  The  collapse  of  the  ICA  was 
followed by two important trends. It first released market forces, which had been contained up to 
that point leading to growing concentration among traders and roasters who were able to capture 
a growing share of the revenue generated by the coffee business. 
 
Secondly, liberalization of the market along with the rise of Vietnam as the third biggest exporter 
also led to an increase in production, price instability and price decline. This has generated a set 
of negative externalities for rural communities. Coffee price instability is not only threatening the 
livelihood,  the  social  and  ecological  fabric  of  millions  of  small  coffee  producers  across  the 
Southern world, it is destabilizing their families and communities who rely on coffee as their 
main source of income. 
 
The  elements  of  the  coffee  crisis  are  well  known  and  analyzed  in  many  studies.  The  ICO
6 
mentions producing countries have seen the price of coffee drop from 120 US$ cents/lb in the 
1980s to less than 50 US$ cents/lb in 2003. At the same time their coffee income has dropped 
from  US$  12  billions  to  US$  5  billions,  despite  growing  volumes  being  sold.  In  countries 
dependent on coffee income, this has very severe consequences like unemployment, poverty, 
                                                 
5 UNCTAD (2002) 
6 ICO (2003) and ICO (2004)  
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migration, mainly men leaving their family behind as they are looking for an income they can 
live on in big cities or abroad, degradation of coffee trees which need several years of attention 
before they can produce good coffee again. The list of negative consequences is long and the 
analysis of causality relations between these phenomena is complex and region specific. It is not 
the purpose of this paper to offer a detailed analysis of this issue. 
 
Figure 1: 
    
Source: ICO and FLO
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2.2. The coffee boom 
 
On the demand side things have also changed since the end of the 1980s. The landscape evolved 
with  the  rise  of  new  patterns  of  consumption  like  specialty,  fair  trade,  organic  and  other 
sustainable coffees becoming popular among consumers. Coffee bar chains and other new ways 
of consuming coffee have developed. Consumers are now faced with hundreds of combinations 
of coffee variety, origin, brewing and grinding methods, flavouring, packaging, and ambiance, 
sustainability  or  fair  content  being  only  one  among  many  attributes  used  as  weapons  in  the 
marketing  battle  to  increase  market  shares.  Pricing  margins  of  more  and  more  differentiated 
businesses concepts like Starbucks or products like Nespresso are generating huge profits, but 
these are of course concentrated at the top of the coffee value chain. 
                                                 
7 The composite average yearly price is computed by averaging monthly price of the composite 
price index provided by the ICO. The composite minimum fair trade price is computed by 
weighting the minimum fair trade price for robusta (1/3) and arabica (2/3). The weights are 
similar as those used for the ICO composite price index.   
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2.3. Explanations to the coffee paradox 
 
There  are  at  least  three  different  kind  of  explanations  to  the  coffee  paradox.  The  first  is 
oversupply.  Since  the  end  of  the  1980s  coffee  production  has  indeed  increased,  but  so  has 
demand.  Inventories  do  not  show  any  clear  trend.  Therefore  oversupply  does  not  seem  to 







A  second  explanation  is  based  on  the  suspicion  that  the  fall  of  the  ICA  and  the  following 
restructuring  and  concentration  movements  within  the  industry  may  have  generated  hidden 
market power. Presently, at the trader level the top three companies (Neumann, Volcafé and 
Ecom) control about 45% of the market. At the roaster level, Philip Morris, Nestlé, Sara Lee, 
Procter  and  Gamble  and  Tchibo  control  69%  of  the  market.
9 Within  some  national  markets 
concentration is even more accentuated. For example, five actors control 70% of all exports in 
Columbia. In the USA and in Germany, 5 roasters respectively control 80% and 84% of the 
market.
10 These elements, however, do not allow us to conclude it is a “roaster conspiracy” that is 
responsible of the coffee crisis.  
 
                                                 
8 Inventories of Cyprus and Ireland were not included in the world inventory because data was 
not available over the whole period. 
9 Daviron, B., Ponte, S. (2006). 
10 Sheperd, B. (2004).  
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What the economic literature has been able to identify is an increasing gap between producers 
and consumers prices of coffee, with producers progressively getting a smaller share of the final 
price.
11 It has also shown the existence of an asymmetry in price change transmission: producer 
prices drop when consumer demand drops, but the increase is much smaller when consumer price 
increase.
12 This phenomena supports the hypothesis demand is driven by product innovation.  
 
In this context it would be possible to define market power in an unorthodox way, not as the 
ability to control quantities and prices, but as the “ability to define the identity of a coffee, in 
other words the ability to set the language and the reference values that determine production 
norms and quality standards”
13, a kind of monopoly on value-added based on the capacity to 
control  information  flows  and  shape  the  way  people  think  or  do  not  think  about  coffee.  An 
interesting debate around this issue can be illustrated by the discussion about the falling share of 
the final price that goes to producers. More traditional authors explain this by the increase of 
“non-coffee costs”
14 whereas more progressive authors consider this as a “creation of value that 
accrues to non-material attributes of coffee”.
15  
 
These terminology variations could seem to be a detail, but they are fundamental in defining 
different approaches to the coffee crisis. The way one thinks about the profits of Starbucks or 
Nestlé will not be the same if one considers they are arising from “non-coffee” innovations or if 
one considers they are arising from non-material attributes coffee producers are not able to profit 
from because too many barriers are separating them from consumers. 
 
                                                 
11 According to Talbot, M. (1997), the share of producers in the final good price has fallen from 
20% before the fall of the ICA to 13% in the middle of the 1990s. 
12 Morisset J. (1998). 
13 Daviron, B., Ponte, S. (2006). 
14 This is how Lewin, B., Giovannucci, D., Varangis, P. (2004) explain observed falling ratios of 
import price to retail price. Another World Bank economist, Krivonos, E. (2004), even tries to 
argue that the liberalization of the coffee industry has decreased the income of producing 
countries, but has increased the share of producers through the elimination of inefficiencies 
arising from state activity. The weakness of her argument lies in the fact she does not make the 
effort to explain the existence of a coffee crisis nobody is contesting. 
15 This critical comparison and the following example of the wine industry are made by Daviron, 
B., Ponte, S. (2006).  
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The absence of direct relationship, the geographic and cultural distance between producers and 
consumers is so large that producers are unable to commercialize and maybe even to imagine a 
final  product  that  would  be  attractive  for  consumers.  Consumers  at  the  other  end  of  the 
commodity chain don’t know anything about coffee as a product and rely on the information 
passed on by intermediaries. Global players among traders, roasters and even retailers perform 
this strategic role of intermediary and they fill the gap not with product information, but with 
brand advertisement that reinforces the power of their trademark and puts a veil on the original 
product and the producer. Any market needs intermediaries, but the barriers along the coffee 
value chain seem to be particularly high. The industry of wine for example, which is mostly 
developed in Western countries, does not know such a situation. Much more efforts are made to 
protect the rights of producers so as to enable them to themselves add value to their product and 
collect a benefit that does not arise from a “non-wine” activity, but from “non-material attributes 
of wine”. 
  
  11 
3. THE FAIR TRADE SYSTEM 
 
Fair trade presents itself as a way not to fill the gap between producers and consumers with 
advertisement and trademarks, but as a way to build the gap through more direct relationships 
that benefit all actors. Historically, alternative trade first developed in the 1950s, mostly on the 
initiative of religious or political utopian groups who established parallel commercial networks. 
The idea to use conventional commercial networks to give Southern producers a direct access to 
consumers  only  appeared  later  on. It  became  possible  when  the  Dutch  fair  trade  association 
created the first Max Havelaar label in 1988. Fair trade labelling made it possible to sell fair trade 
coffee in conventional shops and supermarkets. This possibility triggered the creation of many 
other national initiatives, which have since started to cooperate. 
 
A FINE
16 statement defines fair trade
17 as 
 
“(…) A trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater 
equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading 
conditions to, and securing their rights of, disadvantaged producers and workers – especially in 
the South. Fair Trade organizations (backed by consumers) are actively engaged in supporting 
producers in awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practices of 
conventional international trade.” 
                                                 
16 FINE is a discussion forum created in 1996 for FLO, IFAT, NEWS and EFTA. Since 2004, 
FINE is leading the Fair Trade Advocacy Office in Brussels to promote the cause of fair trade at 
the European and international levels. This statement can be found on the website of the Fairtrade 
Labelling Organization International. FLO International, founded in 1997, is the global umbrella 
organization for 19 national fair trade certification initiatives. The International Fair Trade 
Association (IFAT, created in 1989, formerly International Federation of Alternative Trade) is a 
global association of producers and traders of both FLO-certified and non-certified goods. IFAT 
issues a FTO-label, which unlike the one issued by FLO is not for products, but for 
organizations. The Network of European World Shops (NEWS, founded in 1994) is a network of 
15 national World Shops associations in 13 different countries that tries to promote fair trade and 
increase consumer awareness. The European Fair Trade Association (EFTA, created in 1990) is 
an advocacy and research body dedicated to fair trade, which regroups eleven fair trade 
organizations. 
17 “Fair Trade” or “fair trade” written in two words is used for the fair trade movement as a whole 
whereas “FairTrade” written in one word is used to describe the certification and labeling system 
governed by FLO.   
  12 
3.1. Principles shaping rules established by FLO International 
 




•  Agreed minimum price, usually set ahead of market minima (and never below). 
•  Focus on development and technical assistance via the payment to suppliers of an agreed 
social premium (around 10 per cent of the price of the good, 5 percent for coffee). 
•  Direct  purchasing  from  producers  to  lessen  the  influence  of  intermediaries.  This 
significantly increases the revenue of producers. 
•  Transparent and long-term trading partnerships. 
•  Co-operative, not competitive, dealings. This commitment of fair trade partners can also 
lead to better product quality. 
•  Provision of credit when requested. Producers can ask the importer up to 60% of the total 
purchase amount in advance. This is very useful in a context where credit is often not 
available. 
•  Provision of market information to producers. This can be useful to fair trade producers 
who typically still sell the bulk of their production through conventional channels. 
•  Farmers  and  workers  are  organized  democratically  in  cooperatives  applying  the  one 
farmer, one vote principle to manage the allocation of the social premium. 
•  Sustainable production is practised. The FairTrade label includes environmental standards 
and around 50% of FairTrade labelled coffee is also organic labelled. 
•  No  labour  abuses  occur  during  the  production  process.  Child  and  slave  labour  are 




                                                 
18 This 10 points categorization is taken from Nicholls, A., Opal, C. (2005) and can be found at 
www.fairtrade.net. He then also explains how each of these principles is suited to address market 
failures that exist in many Southern countries, but this is not reported here. These principles do 
not solve all problems and some shortcomings of theses principles will be examined further on in 
section four.  
  13 
3.2. The structure of FLO 
 
These principles and the specific rules are set by Fairtrade Labelling Organization International. 
FLO was created in 1997 in Bonn, Germany, to give momentum to the fair trade movement. All 
fair trade associations joined to establish rules and standards that are common to all actors.
19 This 
move proved necessary to put an end to the increasing number of private initiatives that was 
starting to confuse consumers and threatened to discredit all socially oriented labels.  
 
The work of FLO International can be divided in two parts that are covered by two distinct 
organizations (see figure 3). FLO International e.V. is establishing rules and standards according 
to the principles outlined above, FLO-Cert GmbH certifies producers, traders and manufacturers 
who comply with these rules. The FLO Stakeholders Forum (FLOSF) is composed of producers, 
traders and national initiatives (NI) representatives. The FLOSF elects the Board of Directors 
(BD). Representatives are granted a three-year term. It must be noted that NI representatives are 
elected by the Meeting of Members, not by the FLOSF. 
 
The BD holds the supreme power in the organization. Decisions are taken by consensus and the 
President of the Board has the casting power if consensus proves impossible. The BD appoints 
the members of the Standards and Policy Committee (SPC), the Certification Committee (CC) 
and the Appeals Committee (AC). The SPC distinguishes between fair standards that apply to 
small farmers or to workers in factories and plantations. It also determines fair prices for certified 
products. External experts are associated to these tasks. The CC takes certification decisions and 
the AC deals with appeals regarding these decisions.
20 
 
Standards and labels are tools of power because they are defining rules and monitoring flows of 
information between actors. They are strategic instruments, which result from the asymmetry of 
power existing in the institution in which they have been created. The representative nature of 
                                                 
19 20 national organizations are now gathered by FLO. All follow the same rules and standards. 
All use the Fairtrade label except Transfair USA, Transfair Canada and Max Havelaar 
Switzerland, but this is a choice motivated by marketing reasons. Since consumers are 
accustomed to the existing logo, a switch from the domestic label to FairTrade would decrease 
sales. 
20 See Vallejo, N., Hauselmann, P. (2004) for more details.  
  14 
FLO is extremely important because it guarantees the interests of all actors can be taken into 
consideration. It must however be noted that NIs are given slightly more weight than other actors. 
Presently, Barbara Fiorito is President of the BD. She is the first President who is not a NI 
representative, but neither does she have a trader or a producer background. She has been Deputy 
Chair of Oxfam International from 2000-2005 
 






Board  of  Directors  is  composed  of 
13 members: 
 
•  5 NI representatives 
•  4 producer representatives 
•  2 trader representatives 
•  2 independents 
 
Source: FLO  
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3.3. A comparison of private labelling initiatives 
 
The issue of labelling is a political one. Standards always profit some actors, sometimes even a 
vast  majority  of  them.  In  the  coffee  market,  standards  used  to  be  set  by  state  regulation. 
Regulatory power has progressively shifted towards private actors, leading to a privatization of 
standards. Today, consumer associations request more and more information not only about the 
product itself, but also about its production and processing method.  
 
As fair trade labels started to increase their visibility by fulfilling these demands of the public, 
other actors tried and still try to surf on the same wave. Labels are supposed to be a way to 
discipline  the  flows  of  distorted  information  and  manipulative  images  that  are  used  in 
advertisement. But when labels themselves proliferate and are used as ad hoc marketing tools 
they can confuse consumers and undermine the credibility of labels in general. When national 
initiatives of fair trade created FLO in 1997, it was clear this new label would not be able to 
gather all existing supposedly socially-concerned labels, not only because their objectives are 
different, but because some supposedly socially-concerned labels are void of any social content. 
The  confusion  often  arises  through  the  use  of  terms  like  “sustainability”  or  “responsibility”, 
which are vague enough to let people believe what communication experts want them to believe. 
It is patent when examining the marketing rhetoric and pricing schemes of the most widespread 
labels. 
  
  17 




“Utz Kapeh, which means "good coffee" in a Mayan language, is a global coffee certification 
program. With Utz Kapeh, your favorite coffee brand knows exactly where their coffee comes 
from and that it was grown responsibly. Utz Kapeh-certified coffee growers take care of local 
communities and the environment.”
21 
 
Utz Kapeh is the name of a foundation set up in 1999, based in Guatemala and the Netherlands, 
where Max Haavelar was first created in 1988. It was set up by Ahold, one of the world’s largest 
retail chain, then became an independent initiative. This foundation has set up a code of conduct 
containing  social,  environmental  and  food  safety  standards.  The  issue  is  none  of  the  social 
standards is compulsory. Concerning the pricing scheme, there used to be ridiculous financial 
premium, which has now been abandoned.
22 
 
Starbucks’ CAFE initiative 
 
“Starbucks  developed  socially  responsible  coffee  buying  guidelines  called  C.A.F.E.  Practices 
(Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices) in 2001. These guidelines are designed to help us work 
with  coffee  farmers  to  ensure  high-quality  coffee  and  promote  equitable  relationships  with 
farmers, workers and communities, as well as protect the environment.”
23 
 
Starbucks has launched the CAFE initiative in 2001. It is also built around a code of conduct 
containing many environmental and technical standards and a point system to classify producers. 
Producers  with  most  points  are  privileged  by  Starbucks,  but  there  is  no  premium  paid  to 
producers.  The  rhetoric  however  is  once  again  about  “social  responsibility”  or  “equitable 
                                                 
21 Answer to the question “What is Utz Kapeh?” on the website of Utz Kapeh. 
22 Roasters used to pay $0.01/kg to the foundation. See Ponte, S. (2004) for more details. 
23 Starbucks’ website.  
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relationships  with  communities”.
24  Starbucks  is  trying  to  mix  up  two  different  things: 
conventional business and social responsibility. Starbucks is paying the market price for high-
quality coffee, but no premium is involved. The business concept of Starbucks is conventional. It 
is an abuse of language to call this socially responsible business. 
 
There are other initiatives like the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C), which aims at 
becoming an industry-wide applied code, or the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI), which 
are supported by big firms like Sarah Lee or Nestlé. These groups then also have their own 
internal codes, etc.  
 
The  problem  with  all  these  codes  is  that  quality  improvement  and  implementation  of 
environmental or any other standards are costly and that, in absence of any premium, compliance 
costs  are  totally  shifted  to  producers  who  are  already  undergoing  a  crisis.  Most  labelling 
initiatives do not bother to raise this issue. The answer of the 4C initiative is “experience of other 
sustainable green coffee projects has shown that the so-called costs of compliance are partially 
offset by savings e.g. due to more effective management practices and better trained workers. 
Coffee  trade  and  industry  as  well  as  partner  organizations  and  institutions  will  support 
producers in the development of tailor-made management plans. The verification costs are part 
of the overall costs of the coffee and will be included in the calculation of the individual buyers 
and sellers.”
25  Crudely said, these codes do not care about the interests of producers. What these 
codes do is not helping producers, but putting new barriers to select the ones most able to fulfil 
these standards without any financial counterpart.  
 
                                                 
24 This terminology seems odd when one knows Starbucks is discouraging unionization among its 
own employees: “We firmly believe that the direct employment relationship which we currently 
have with our partners is the best way to ensure a great work environment. We believe we do not 
need a third party to act on behalf of our partners. We prefer to deal directly with them in a fair 
and respectful manner, just as we have throughout our history.” Starbucks Position Regarding 
Unions Representing Our Partners, December 2005.  
25 Common Code for the Coffee Community: New Frequently Asked Questions. Available at 
www.sustainable-coffee.net  
  19 
3.3.2. With a financial compensation 
 
The  Fairtrade  label  certified  by  FLO  is  actually  the  only  label,  which  offers  a  financial 
counterpart to help producers adapt to the standards it wants to promote.
26 FLO offers a minimum 
price for the four traditional coffee varieties that is never below the market price, often above it. 
Producers get an additional premium if the coffee is also organic certified
27 and, on the top of 






Figure 5:                 Figure 6: 
 
Source: ICO and FLO. Robusta
28 is the coffee for which the price difference has been highest and 
washed Arabica the coffee for which is has been lowest. 
                                                 
26 Coffee certified by organic and shade-grown labels (Bird-friendly, Rainforest Alliance) is also 
sold at a price above the market price, but it is not the result of a fixed premium. It equates to 
selling coffee on a different market. Productivity in these kinds of culture is lower, production 
more scarce. Coffee is therefore more expensive. The premium offered on these different markets 
have been estimated by various authors, but they are far below the premium offered by FairTrade. 
See Ponte, S. (2004). 
27 Around 40% of Fairtrade coffee is double certified, this means certified organic and Fairtrade. 
28 Almost all robusta production is unwashed. FLO makes a distinction, but the ICO does not 
provide statistics for washed robusta.  
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4. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 
 
4.1. Benefits to producers 
 
Such a system of course generates benefits for producers who participate in fair trade and the 
reality of these benefits is not put into question. Websites of fair trade organizations display many 
success stories explaining to the reader how the life of producers has been changed. A more 
complex question concerns the limits of these benefits rather than their existence or their nature.  
 
There are many methodological problems encountered when assessing the impacts of fair trade 
on  producers
29 and  because  it  is  not  easy  to  disentangle  it  from  that  of  other  factors.  Many 
descriptive case studies have been made in the field, but the fact that many of them only describe 
one point in time is problematic. Case studies involving quantitative case studies are rare because 
it is difficult to gather quantitative information in a reliable way in the field.
30 Broader research 
programs drawing on several case studies are interesting because the methodological coherence 





                                                 
29 For an extensive discussion of methodological problems, see Paul E. (2005) “Evaluating Fair 
Trade as a Development Project: Methodological Considerations”. Her article examines the 
issues that are linked to the use of quantitative, qualitative, participatory and other methods and 
how criteria established for the assessment of development projects (by the OECD and other 
institutions) can be applied to fair trade projects on the field.  
30 See Bechetti, L., Costantino, M. (2005) and Bacon, C. (2005). 
31 Since no case study has been made for this paper, it is more relevant to expose the impact of 
fair trade and some problematic aspects of it in a general manner. The sources used here are two 
academic research programs available on fair trade. The first is from the Colorado State 
University, which has published seven case studies made in coffee cooperatives (see 
http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/Sociology/FairTradeResearchGroup/ and Taylor, P. (2002)). The 
second is from the Université de Liège and has been realized in collaboration with the Belgian 
Science Policy. It draws on four case studies, two of them in coffee cooperatives and two others 
in the banana sector.   
  21 
4.1.1. Benefits in general 
 
Observed benefits to producers who trade according to fair trade principles cited above, and some 
of their limits, can be regrouped under several points.
32  
 
•  First, income of small producers often rises due to the fair trade minimum price and social 
premium. This is true, but often limited by two factors. The first problem is that even with 
a  growing  market, Fairtrade  coffee  is  oversupplied. This  means  the  share  of  coffee  a 
certified small producer can sell through fair trade channels is often only 30%. The rest 
has to be sold on the conventional market without any premium. If this is not much, it is 
however often enough to act as a partial subsidy preventing rural migration. An important 
critique made to fair trade is that it cannot reach the poorest areas where producers are not 
organized in cooperatives or that some cooperatives will not let enter farmers without 
meeting certain internal standards. The second factor is the social premium is often not 
redistributed to the farmers, but used at the level of the cooperative for collective projects. 
This can be positive, but it does not directly raise the income of small producers. Another 
issue is that if the cooperative is too big, then the project may not benefit all members 
equally. Some of the members may actually not see them at all if the organization is too 
big.
33 
•  Second,  fair  trade  is  enhancing  price  stability.  The  minimum  price  and  long-term 
partnerships make it easier to estimate future income. Coffee growers can then better 
allocate their income and better invest into education or long-term projects. Long-term 
partnership can however not be enforced and a trader cannot be sanctioned for switching 
from one producer to another. The fact growers can request up to 60% of pre-financing 
protects them from local middle-men who make a lot of profit when farmers have to sell 
part of their production under the market price because they are in need of immediate 
                                                 
32 Some authors also use binary categories like direct/indirect to classify benefits for producers. 
33 FLO certifies first grade organizations, but also second grade organizations (group of 
cooperatives, represented by leaders of each cooperative) and third grade organizations (see FLO-
Cert Producer Certification Fees, 2006). This is giving producers an incentive to structure their 
organizations at a regional or national level. It also increases the distance between decision-
makers and producers.  
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cash. There are some stories about producers being afraid to ask for pre-financing because 
purchasers  threatened  to  terminate  the  partnership.  There  are  also  cases  where  pre-
financing was granted but with interest rates annihilating part of the financial benefits. 
•  Fair trade promotes decent working conditions. The label guarantees good social, sanitary 
and environmental standards are observed. It also insists on the gender issue. Traditional 
criticisms are some standards may not be adapted to local circumstances, the minimum 
price may be too high or certifiers may not be empathic enough. The gender issue and the 
militant aspect of fair trade appear to be more a concern for certifiers than for producers 
themselves who sometimes see FLO standards as a kind of “nice neo-colonialism”, a 
fantasy of consumers that would like producers to be like them. Consumers see fair trade 
as a social movement, whereas most producers tend to simply consider it a niche market. 
The incentive to democratically organize into cooperatives contributes to the development 
of stronger communities, which have a stronger common identity and a feeling of pride. It 
however limits the scale of the business and can hinder efficiency.
34 
•  Fair trade increases capacity building and market access for cooperatives. Relationships 
with  fair  trade  organizations  lead  to  an  improvement  of  production  and  management 
methods,  of  quality  and  human  capital.  They  also  provide  cooperatives  market 
information  throughout  the  year  and  ideas  of  how  to  market  their  products.  Many 
cooperatives  start  to  organize  among  themselves  at  a  national  level,  seek  for  organic 
certifications, organize “fair tourism”, open coffee bar chains, launch their own brand, 
enter in contact with small roasters or multinationals to sell them their product directly. It 
also increases the credibility of cooperatives towards banks or government institutions, 
which  provide  other  development  programs.  It  is  a  kind  of  subsidized  “market 
apprenticeship”  that  makes  cooperatives  more  independent.  In  the  least  developed 
cooperatives, fair trade can however be a trap, producers being really dependent on it 
without being able to diversify or develop a sustainable commercial strategy.  
 
There is no way to quantify these benefits or the dynamic they generate within cooperatives. The 
impossibility is not only a matter of data, but of methodology. What clearly appears is all these 
                                                 
34 The issue of economies of scale is best discussed in Mendoza, R., Bastiaensen, J. (2003) who 
are talking of “bonsai trade”.  
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benefits attract many producers and lead to oversupply within the fair trade market. This was 
aggravated by the fact that up to 2003, certification fees existed only for traders or manufacturers 
of fair trade products, not for producers. Now producers have to pay to get certified and they have 
the responsibility to find buyers for their certified products.  
 
4.1.2. An estimate of financial benefits 
 
What is possible to estimate are the global financial benefits that accrue to producers. Table 2 
shows an estimate of yearly and cumulative financial flows accruing to producers for the period 
2001-2005. It should be noted certification costs are not included in these estimations. FLO does 
not  provide  detailed  figures  about  them.  The  information  that  is  published  is  there  are  231 
certified coffee producers’ organizations out of 508 certified producers’ organization. The costs 
schemes  of  certification  are  also  known.
35 The  annual  accounts  of  FLO  International  show 
“Membership  Contributions”  amount  to  1’333’982  Euros.
36 If  coffee  producer  organizations 
amount  to  45%  of  certified  members,  then  they  contribute  to  around  600’000  Euros  in 
“membership contributions” a year. So the financial costs are much smaller than the benefits. If 
the costs are taken into account in the computations of table 2, then the average premium for a 
single producer would drop by about US$ 5 down to US$ 180 a year.  
 
If it is assumed that an average coffee producers’ organization gathers 500 workers
37, then fair 
trade is benefiting 115’500 out of the 25 millions coffee producers, this means 0.46% of them. It 
appears fair trade is generating substantive benefits but to a very limited number of producers. It 
is not possible to describe how a typical certified producer organization looks because there are 
too many differences among them. Some may be bigger or richer than others; some may gather 
                                                 
35 See FLO-Cert Producer Certification Fees (2006). The initial certification fee is around 3000 
Euros for small farmers and cooperatives, a little more for plantations using hired labor. Renewal 
certification fees are rather around 2000 Euros. Fees vary according to the size of the 
organization, the number of certified products, etc. 
36 Available online at www.fairtrade.net 
37 This assumption relies on the producer organizations size categories made by FLO-cert: 0-100 
members, 101-500, 501-1000, >1000 (see FLO-Cert Producer Certification Fees (2006)) and on 
descriptions made in the cited case studies. See also table 5 in appendix.  
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small farmers into cooperatives; others may be plantations using hired workers;
38 some may have 
ties with the state, others may be completely independent.  
 
Table 2: An estimate of financial benefits to coffee producers 
Year  Total quantities 
Yearly average  
price difference  
Minimum price 
premium  
    in lb (0.4536 kg)  in US$ cents  in US$ million 
2001  31,610,229.28  60.79  21.11247213 
2002  34,510,141.09  57.95166667  22.0698104 
2003  43,718,253.97  53.725  26.11072718 
2004  53,401,675.49  41.37166667  25.29726371 
2005  74,938,271.60  13.39833333  14.53677572 
Total  238,178,571.43     109.1270491 
Year  Total amount paid to producers Social premium   Social premium  
   in US$ million  in US$ cents  in US$ million 
2001  34.7712522  5  1.580511464 
2002  37.9611552  5  1.725507055 
2003  48.09007937  5  2.185912698 
2004  58.74184303  5  2.670083774 
2005  82.43209877  5  3.74691358 
Total  261.9964286     11.90892857 
Average yearly premium in US$ million  21.34905269 
Average yearly premium for coffee producers organization in US$
39  92420 
Average yearly premium for a single producer in US$
40  185 
Source: ICO and FLO.  
 
Since fair trade pretends to help most vulnerable producers, this diversity can be criticized. The 
fact  FLO  does  not  release  detailed  information  about  all  certified  organizations  is  perfectly 
understandable, but it also allows to legitimately raise doubts about the claim saying fair trade is 
benefiting most vulnerable producers. First, non-organized producers cannot benefit from fair 
trade.  Secondly,  some  producer  organizations  may  not  be  among  the  poorest  or  they  may 
                                                 
38 FLO standards where first tailored for cooperatives, but later adapted to plantations using hired 
labor. 
39 According to FLO, there are 231 certified coffee producers’ organizations in 2005. This 
number is taken as constant over the period. Considering the number of certified organizations is 
increasing over time, the average premium may have decreased, but when making such a 
inference, one should also take into consideration quantities are increasing and the world market 
price is fluctuating. 
40 It is assumed that an average producer organization gathers 500 producers.   
  25 
continue to benefit from fair trade as their business is getting better. Several studies
41 show that 
partnerships are not formed with the poorest. They are formed with a fringe of the population that 
is certainly poor, but capable of some production efficiency. Fair trade cannot escape the fairness 
versus  efficiency  trade-off.  Its  capacity  to  loosen  it  through  an  original  financial  scheme  is 
helping a tiny minority of poorer producers.  
 
Fair trade organizations are ambiguous on this issue. On the on hand it is claimed fair trade is 
working because it is trade not aid. On the other hand, fair trade is said to be “in and against” the 
market  and  these  organizations  are  using  the  aid  rhetoric  and  imagery  in  their  marketing 
messages. It is interesting to notice other initiatives without monetary compensations (Starbucks, 
Utz Kapeh, etc.) also claim to provide benefits and help producers. It is an open question to know 
if it is a good thing to try to help producers and if and how such an asymmetric relationship can 
become  balanced  one  day.  What  seems  to  be  unanimously  agreed  on  however  is  the  “help 
rhetoric” is helping marketing strategies.  
 
The danger fair trade is conveying is the illusion to represent a sufficient answer to the problem 
of development and to the coffee crisis in particular. The total amount of financial transfer and 
the number of producers concerned are so small that it is not possible to think about fair trade as a 
means to reduce poverty at a large scale. The financial transfers generated by fair trade do not 
even amount to the public development aid of a small country. It may have other virtues: it may 
be  better  targeted,  avoid  state  corruption,  etc.  However,  considering  the  sceptical  approach 
prevailing in the literature on public development aid, it seems odd fair trade is benefiting from 
such a positive media coverage. This may be linked to the interests of other actors. This issue is 
examined in the next sections. 
 
                                                 
41 Department of International Development (1998), Hopkins, R. (2000), Taylor, P. (2002), 
Belgian Science Policy in collaboration with the Université de Liège (2005)  
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Figure 7: 
 
Source: ICO and FLO. 
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4.2. Benefits to fair trade organizations 
 
There is no literature about the benefits that accrue to these “new intermediaries”. All national 
initiatives that are gathered under the FLO Fairtrade label are non-profit or charity organizations. 
It does however not mean they do not benefit from the expansion of fair trade. It is interesting to 
get an idea about how these organizations are financed and what amounts are involved. The 
direction of financial flows is depicted in figure 4. The amounts are more difficult to estimate 
precisely, but some features can be roughly inferred when looking at the annual accounts of these 
organizations. 
 
All  fair  trade  organizations  are  different  and  there  is  no  point  in  covering  all  of  them.  The 
accounts of the Fairtrade Foundation (UK), Max Havelaar Switzerland and FLO International are 
examined here in order to give the reader an idea about this diversity. The Fairtrade Foundation 
has been founded in 1992 by Christian Aid, Oxfam, Tradecraft Exchange, World Development 
Movement and the National Federation of Women’s Institutes.  At  the  beginning  it  was  fully 
financed by these founding members. Today, 83% of the expenses are covered by traders and 
manufacturers certification fees income. Its board of directors hosts 12 trustees who are elected 
for three years. None of them is remunerated. In 2005, Fairtrade Foundation employed 25 people. 
None of them is earning more than £5’000 a month and the average wage was of £2220 in 2005 
up from £2190 in 2004. These numbers do not include social security costs, pension contributions 
or agency staff costs.
42 
 
Max Havelaar Switzerland was also created in 1992 as a non-profit organization by Pain pour le 
Prochain, Caritas, Action de Carême, EPER, Helvetas and Swissaid. Its structure is similar to the 
one of other fair trade organizations. It was financially supported by the Seco at the start of the 
project, but is now completely independent. Certification fees cover all costs and even a little 
more. The average wage was of CHF 8520 all included in 2005 up form CHF 6620 in 2004.
43 
                                                 
42 All these information are taken from the annual accounts of the Fairtrade Foundation, which 
are available at www.fairtrade.org.uk 
43 These numbers are computed by dividing the salary costs by the number of employees which is 
taken as constant over the two years (26 at the moment according to Max Havelaar Switzerland, 
most of them part-time jobs). Because it is not possible to know what type of contract each  
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This may seem to be rather high numbers, but Max Havelaar Switzerland is probably the richest 
fair trade organization. This can be explained by the success of fair trade products in Switzerland. 
 





Source: Fondation Max Havelaar (Suisse)
44 
 
FLO International was created by national initiatives in 1997. Like the Fairtrade Foundation, 
(producers) certification fees do only cover part of the costs: 63% in 2005 up from 51% in 2004. 
It is not possible to estimate the average wage of an FLO employee based on the information that 
is available. Considering the organization is still financially dependent on external grants, it can 





                                                                                                                                                             
employee has signed, these numbers are only indicative and should not be used for further 
interpretations. Furthermore, the 28% jump of the average wage seems to indicate the number of 
employees must have increased between the two years. 
44 Fondation Max Havelaar (Suisse), Rapport annuel 2005.  
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4.3. Benefits to retailers 
 
Unlike non-profit fair trade organizations, retailers do not have to be committed to any cause. The 
benefits that accrue to them through the sale of fair trade product are at least two-fold: financial 
profits and image improvement.  
 
Retailers do not disclose any information about their pricing policy. Assuming retailers are on 
average adding a 30% margin on the product they sell could allow us to estimate the financial 
revenues from fair trade coffee, but as long as there is no observed difference in pricing policy 
between  fair  trade  and  conventional  products,  this  is  not  very  interesting.  There  have  been 
isolated cases of observed abusive pricing margins. In Britain, Sainsbury was caught selling fair 
trade bananas four time the conventional price and Tesco PLC, another supermarket chain, was 
caught tacking US$ 3.36 per pound while the grower was getting 44 cents above the market 
price.
45 Similar abuses can occur, but they are not likely because the incentives for big players are 
not  going  in  that  direction.  On  the  one  hand,  the  volumes  of  fair  trade  sales  are  small.  The 
potential image gains on the other hand are big. The vigilance and communication power of 
consumer associations makes it not worthwhile to try to cheat on consumers this way. It is much 
more beneficial for retailers to use the image of fair trade to improve their own image. This raises 
the issue of clean-washing 
 
Many  people  within  the  fair  trade  movement  believe  consumer  awareness  can  substantially 
contribute to a solution to the coffee crisis or to poverty and development issues in general. Fair 
trade  organizations  often  talk  about  how  raising  awareness  of  consumers  can  help  make  a 
difference. Supermarket chains have now jumped on that wagon and propose to consumers to 
“shop for a better world”. But is consumer awareness making a difference? This section looks at 
the validity of this first claim. It then examines a second hypothesis, namely that supermarkets 
are  clean-washing  their  hands  in  the  fair  trade  business.  Clean-washing  is  here  defined  as 
                                                 
45 Stecklow, S., White, E. (2004). The Fairtrade Foundation (2005a, 2005b) answers this issue 
saying its role is not to check margins supermarkets are charging, but to make sure producers are 
getting a fair price. It also does not have the capacity to control supermarkets. It affirms abuses 
are exceptional and gives several example of price comparison to make its argument. The price of 
fair trade products may be higher, but it is due to smaller scales and higher costs of production 
and higher costs. See table 6 in appendix.  
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misleading  consumers  by  using  fair  trade  as  a  marketing  tool  to  upgrade  one’s  image  as  a 
responsible and socially concerned stakeholder. If supermarkets claim to help poor producers 
through consumer awareness raising knowing consumer awareness raising does not help poor 
producers, the behaviour of supermarkets only amounts to, first, raise consumer awareness that 
supermarkets distribute Fairtrade products and, second, strengthen the illusion they are doing 
something to help poor producers.  
 
These issues have not yet been tackled in the existing literature. Several steps are needed before it 
is possible to test these two hypotheses. First, inspiration sources will be mentioned in a short 
literature review. The second step is a discussion about how possible determinants, including 
consumer awareness, can affect fair trade coffee market shares and how to measure them. The 
third step raises the issues of data choice and of the reliability of data sources. The fourth step 
explains the models used to test the two hypotheses and why they have been chosen. Results are 
then interpreted and an answer given to the two hypotheses tested. 
 
4.3.1. Literature review 
 
There are different kinds of literature on this issue. First, many articles deal with the question of 
the  extent  to  which  personal  ethics  influence  purchasing  behaviour  of  individuals  through 
boycotts and other actions (Strong, 1997; Shaw and Clarke, 1999; Carrigan and Attalla, 2000; 
Carrigan, Smizgin and Wright, 2004; Low and Davenport, 2005). These articles are all based on 
group interviews and their conclusions vary according to the observed sample and employed 
methodology. On the basis of this more psychological than economic literature it is not possible 
to draw definitive conclusions about the effect of ethics on purchasing behaviour, but it does not 
seem reasonable to assume the effect is non-existent or cannot be reinforced. Since the approach 
focuses on individuals and small groups, it appears that, at that level, one should consider the 
existing individual differences as well as the group dynamics that also have an impact. 
 
Secondly,  some  economists  have  developed  trade  and  microeconomic  models  with  utility 
functions able to account for more complex preferences. Maseland and De Vaal (2002) compare 
fair trade (which he defines as trade with an additional cost), free trade and protectionism policies  
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in two-country comparative cost and economies of scale models. They find that although fair 
trade is often first best from the planner point of view, its success depends on the characteristic of 
the product and on the context within which international trade takes place. Kok, Nahuis and De 
Vaal (2004) assume trade is negatively related to labour standards in a two-country world.  South, 
which primarily cares about material welfare, has low labour standards, but these have a negative 
psychological externality in the North. Trying to establish the conditions for the optimal outcome, 
they  find  a  coordinated  solution  dominates  unilateral  measures  by  North  to  decrease  its 
psychological externality. Becchetti and Adriani (2005) consider the case of two countries with 
perfect competition in the North and a monopsonist profiting from low wages in the South. They 
also define a utility function of Northern consumers who care about the fairness of the good, and 
are  more  or  less  concerned  about  fairness  and  international  equality.  They  establish  the 
conditions  under  which  a  minimal  share  of  altruistic  consumers  in  the  North  can  lead  the 
monopsonist  to  supply  fair  goods  and  pay  fair  wages  in  the  South.  Becchetti,  Solferin  and 
Tessitore (2005) imagine a dynamic world with two duopolists. One of them is zero profit and 
socially concerned. Consumers’ habits follow a defined law of motion They find the optimal 
price of the profit maximizing duopolist is lower than in the static case because the socially 
concerned duopolist would otherwise increase its future market shares due to consumers’ habit 
formation. The threshold triggering imitation is also higher in the dynamic than in the static case, 
depending on the switching cost from one type of products to the other. None of these models 
have of course been tested yet. 
 
Most  valuable  market  information  is  in  the  hands  of  supermarket  chains  and  fair  trade 
organizations. Some of the latter make information available to the public on their website or 
upon request. The studies made by Alter Eco and PwC in France (2001), Max Havelaar and 
Sonecom in Belgium (2005) are the most interesting commercial studies available to the public. 
All point to correlations that exist between fair trade consumption, fair trade knowledge, fair 
trade perception, income, education, age, gender and other variables. On the academic side, the 
Belgian Science Policy (2005) has done a similar study for the Belgian market
46. Giovannucci 
(2001)  has  issued  a  report  on  the  perspectives  for  sustainable  coffee (fair  trade,  organic  and 
                                                 
46 It is actually the most complete report on fair trade that is available. It considers the supply as 
well as the demand side in a very detailed manner. The approaches used however draw often 
more on other social sciences than on economics.  
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specialty coffees) in North America and another about some European countries and Japan (2003, 
with  Koekoek).  These  reports  describe  the  position  of  sustainable  coffee  on  each  individual 
market  through  a  description  of  the  commercial  partners,  the  expectations  of  the  people 
responsible  of  purchase,  price  differentials,  the  structure  of  the  retail  markets,  etc.  Lewin, 
Giovannucci and Varangis (2004) draw a picture of the coffee market as a whole, which allows to 
put sustainable coffee in its broader economic context. The books of Nicholls and Opal (2005) as 
well as the one of Ponte (2006) which include the ideas he exposed in his 2004 article also help 
place the question of fair trade in perspective, but up to now none of all the cited contributions 
contain any model allowing to deal with the determinants of demand for fair trade coffee.  
 
De Meuron (2003) has done a cross-country analysis of the determinants of demand for fair trade 
bananas  and  he  finds  variables  like  the  number  of  shops,  price  differentials  and  advertising 
budget matter to a different extent. He does not touch on the issue of consumer awareness. At the 
microeconomic level, Becchetti and Rosati (2003) have carried out a more elaborate study based 
on answers of more than thousand Italian world shop clients to a questionnaire designed to this 
purpose.  Using  a  simultaneous  two-equation  treatment  regression  model,
47 they  find  that 
awareness (the knowledge people have) of the criteria
48 defining fair trade has a positive impact 
on consumption, on the willingness to pay a premium and on the demand price elasticity. 
 
It is obvious the issue of awareness has not been in the centre of most of these studies and only 
Becchetti and Rosati have used econometric tools to tackle this question. The first hypothesis of 
this paper is the same as the one of Becchetti and Rosati, but it is transposed and tested at a macro 
level.  The  second  hypothesis  about  clean-washing  is  tested  for  the  first  time.  It  is  the 
differentiation among various actors that makes it possible to test it. 
 
                                                 
47 Their sample consists of answers to a questionnaire about fair trade. It was collected in world 
shops only. Because world shop consumers may not be representative of all consumers, the 
sample is likely to be biased. The chosen model deals with this bias. 
48 Their variable representing awareness is scaled from 0 to 8, one point being given for each of 
the 8 criteria that define fair trade.   
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4.3.2. Actors and factors impacting on fair trade coffee market share 
 
First of all, to buy fair trade coffee, consumers must know it exists and be able to recognize it. In 
practice it means they must be able to recognize the logo/label of fair trade products. What will 
be called fair trade “awareness”
49, is expected to be positively related to market shares. Since 
awareness seems to increase with time, another variable susceptible to catch fair trade awareness 
is  the  number  of  years  since  fair  trade  coffee  has  been  launched
50.  It  is  true  that  awareness 
increases with time, but using a linear variable like the number of years is probably less accurate 
since it omits variations that can arise through intensive media coverage, marketing and other 
factors that have an indirect impact through increased awareness. 
 
World shops and volunteers probably also play an important role for the success of fair trade. 
These constitute the historical basis on which fair trade has developed, but it is not clear if they 
are a stimulator or hinder the expansion of fair trade. In countries where volunteers are numerous 
and world shops widespread, the structure might be less efficient or supermarket chains might be 
less attracted to enter the market of fair trade products, since demand is already partially satisfied. 
On the other hand, in a market were consumers are already educated about fair trade, it might be 
easier to transform them into daily consumers of fair trade coffee. 
 
Supermarkets were inexistent at the beginning of the movement but have become important with 
the  decision  of  fair  trade  labelling  organization  to  go  mainstream.  Some  in  the  fair  trade 
movement have placed a lot of hope into this ideological and practical mini-revolution, but the 
global consequences of the entry of supermarkets into the fair trade game are not clear yet. The 
inclusion  of  supermarkets  in  the  game  makes  fair  trade  products  accessible  to  many  more 
consumers. The magnitude of the impact, however, depends on the sensitivity of consumers to 
the fairness issue and on the effort made by supermarkets to make the product attractive. 
 
                                                 
49 The percentage of consumers able to recognize the fair trade label or logo is chosen because 
fair trade organizations often take it as an indicator of their own success. It is here used to verify 
if this indicator does mean something in terms of purchasing behavior and market shares. 
50 De Meuron used the number of years in his regressions and they turned out to be significant 
and positive.  
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A priori, price differential between conventional and fair trade coffee should have a negative 
impact on market shares. As the market studies cited earlier all show, a vast majority of the 
people would buy fair trade coffee if it were sold for the same price as conventional coffee. If we 
draw a parallel with the fair trade banana studied by De Meuron (2003) and a poll conducted 
within 15 EU states in 1997
51, 74% of the people declare they would buy fair trade bananas at the 
same price, 37% would be ready to pay 10% more, 11% would pay 20% more and 5% would be 
ready to pay 30% more. The number might be misleading since they are based on declarations 
and not purchasing habits, and the parallel might be misleading too since bananas are a much 
more standardized commodity than coffee is. Branding plays a more important role for coffee 
than bananas thus hindering the readiness to switch from one brand to another for price reasons, 
but even if the price effect is not expected to be as strong as for bananas, it is still expected to be 
negative. This will be an indication about the demand price elasticity. 
 
The number of other fair trade products in each country is another possible determinant. The 
more people have the choice to consume fair trade products the more they will get used to it, be 
able to recognize the fair trade label and consume fair trade coffee. The marketing budget of fair 
trade organizations should also be positive and significant. 
 
General  factors  like  per  capita  income  or  education  might  also  have  a  positive  impact  on 
consumption of fair trade coffee. The more you earn, the less you will be hindered by the added 
cost of the fair premium. And the more the population is educated, the more it will be able to 
understand the implications of its consumption habits. These positive relations are observed in 
different market studies and have been confirmed at the individual level. It remains to see if they 
hold at the aggregate level. 
 
Finally, the per capita coffee consumption is also a variable of interest, but its effect is difficult to 
guess. In his analysis of fair trade banana demand, De Meuron (2003) found there was a positive 
relation between quantities consumed and market shares. It is possible to understand this for a 
raw commodity like banana, but it is not obvious this would hold for a product like fair trade 
                                                 
51 Attitudes of EU Consumers to Fair Trade Bananas, EUROBAROMETER survey carried out in 
all 15 EU Member States by INRA in 1997.  
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coffee for several reasons. First, a lot of coffee is consumed out of home, and in most countries 
the out of home market has not yet been infiltrated by fair trade. Therefore, if the out of home 
consumption is large enough, a high per capita coffee consumption might have a negative effect 
on market shares. Second, the bigger the market, the more already established brands will fight 
for it. Since coffee is a product embedded with symbolic values, it might not be easy to shift 
consumption habits and the relation might be negative. 
 
Other  important  determinants  for  which  there  are  unfortunately  no  available  data  are  the 
marketing  expenditures  of  supermarkets,  the  media  coverage,  the  number  of  institutions  or 
universities that propose fair trade coffee. These factors probably have an impact, but will act as 
omitted variables in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.3.3. Data and the selection bias 
 
Different kinds of data have been used for this paper. First, there is data coming from the OECD 
(GDP per capita, education), which is not problematic. Then there is data taken from a report 
done  by  Giovanucci  and  Koekoek  (2003)  who  estimate  the  price  differential  between 
conventional and fair trade coffee
52. Data about per capita coffee consumption comes from the 
ICO. Finally, there is data about fair trade in general gathered by FINE in successive reports, and 
enquiries to find the lacking data. 
 
Data about fair trade is usually scarce and not uniform. This is due to the decentralized nature of 
these organizations, which want to maintain their autonomy and specificities. Some progresses 
have  been  made  in  the  last  decade.  In  1995,  1998,  2001  and  2005
53,  FINE  has  collected 
information from European fair trade organization and published a report (done by EFTA) on the 
state of fair trade in Europe. The reports of 2001 and 2005 contain data about the number of 
                                                 
52 Missing data about price differentials was completed by asking the concerned fair trade 
organizations (Austria, Ireland).  
53 Actually the report is based on data gathered between mid-2004 up to mid-2005. The years 
used as reference in this paper are 2001 and 2004.  
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supermarkets, world shops, volunteers
54, and marketing expenditure of fair trade organizations in 
different European countries. The FINE reports are problematic for several reasons. Data about 
market shares is not precise enough.
55 Data about awareness is delicate since the polls were not 
designed the same way in all countries
56. Some data was missing and it was necessary to contact 
these organizations to ask them to complete it. This was the opportunity to get some information 
about other variables of interest: the number of years since fair trade coffee has been launched, 
the number of fair trade products that are commercialized.  
 
There have been three reasons for selecting countries and excluding others. First, the reports of 
EFTA only concern European countries, so even if some information is available about Japan, 
Canada or the USA, it was not possible to gather the same information about these countries. 
Secondly,  Luxembourg  has  been  omitted  because  the  ICO  aggregates  it  to  Belgium  in  its 
statistics, so it was not possible to compute the market shares of Luxembourg as has been done 
for other countries. Thirdly, in some countries fair trade is a new phenomenon and fair trade 
organizations  are  not  yet  well-organized  enough  to  publish  information  about  their  activities 
(Czech  Republic,  Greece,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia)  or  do  not  do  it 
consistently (Spain, Portugal, Malta). The sample is therefore limited to 13 countries for the years 
2001  and  2004.  It  obviously  contains  a  selection  bias  that  needs  to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
econometric part. A list of countries, descriptive statistics, a correlation table and the data set can 
be found in appendix (table 7, 8, 9, 10). 
 
                                                 
54 The number of volunteers has not been reported in the 2005 report and is therefore considered 
unchanged between the two periods. The variable vol is however not constant because population 
has changed. 
55 Therefore, the data for market shares has been computed on the basis of numbers from the ICO 
and FLO for quantities of imported coffee and imported fair trade coffee. The numbers reflect the 
market share relative to the total coffee market in each country, including the out of home 
consumption market. This explains why the estimated market shares are much lower than those 
declared by fair trade organizations or supermarkets. 
56 Fair trade organizations have sent me the polls they have made so I could complete the lacking 
data. It is assumed reasonable to compare the numbers.  
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To make the following econometric analysis easier to follow, the variables will be named as 
follows:
57 
1.  mktshare: fair trade coffee market share in percentage of total domestic coffee market. 
2.  awareness: number of people who recognizes the fair trade label per 1000 inhabitants. 
3.  supermkts: number of supermarkets per 1000 inhabitants. 
4.  wshops: number of world shops per 1000 inhabitants. 
5.  vol: number of volunteers per 1000 inhabitants. 
6.  marketing:  amount  spent  by  fair  trade  organizations  on  consumer  education,  public 
relations operations and marketing per 1000 inhabitants. 
7.  price: price differential between conventional and fair trade coffee in percent. 
8.  coffee_h: per capita yearly coffee consumption in kilogram. 
9.  educ: average years of schooling in 2003. 
10. ft_products: number of other fair trade products that are commercialized. 
11. d_aw42: a dummy taking a value of one for observations where the awareness level is 
equal to or above 42%. 
12. d_aw24100: a dummy taking a value of one for countries where awareness has increased 
by more that 24% over four years.
58 
 
                                                 
57 GDP per capita and the number of years since fair trade coffee has been launched do not 
appear in this list because they do not appear in the regressions shown in this paper. 
58 d_aw42 and d_aw24100 are are dummies used for treatment regressions. Further explanations 
about this model, the role and choice of threshold dummies under 4.3.5   
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4.3.4. Test H1: Does awareness make a difference? 
4.3.4.1. Model: OLS with dummies 
 
To see if awareness matters and to differentiate among the impact of the various actors and 
factors, the best approach would probably consist in applying a panel data model with fixed or 
random effects to capture country specific factors and the influence of omitted variables. The 
restricted number of observations makes it impossible to use a dummy for each country in a 
significant way. The adopted approach will therefore be to run OLS regressions for various sets 
of independent variables so as to find the best possible fit using usual information criteria and, 
later on, to expand it with dummies regrouping countries according to a relevant criterion. A 
treatment regression model is used in 4.3.5. to correct for the selection bias mentioned above. The 
general form of the OLS equation used to estimate various models part is the following 
 
yi =   + x1i ' 1 + x2i ' 2 + d_time  3 + d_groupi ' 4 + µi 
 
where fair trade coffee market share is the dependent variable regressed on a constant, a first set 
of variables representing actors (x1), a second set of factors (x2), a time dummy marking the 
difference between the observations of 2001 and those of 2004 (d_time) and dummies regrouping 
countries according to a specific criterion (d_group).  
 
The issue of omitted variables has already been addressed above. Their effect will be transmitted 
to the constant, the dummy variables and the error term. Another issue is correlation among 
independent variables. Looking at correlation table in the appendix, it appears multicollinearity is 
not a problem. Endogeneity too is not assumed to be a problem. Market shares are too small to 
explain the level of awareness. Assuming the opposite would overestimate the lucidity of the 
consumer wandering along supermarket shelves. At this stage of development, causality does not 
yet go the other way round. There is no way to test for autocorrelation in the present situation. 
The heteroskedasticity hypothesis is rejected by a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. 
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4.3.4.2. Results and interpretation 
 
OLS regressions are reported in table 3. They are classified according to improving information 
criteria and reveal several interesting points. First, awareness level is always significant and has a 
positive sign. Its magnitude however is low. Coefficients between 0.00141  and 0.00273 mean a 
increase of awareness of 1 per 1000 rises fair trade coffee market share by something between 
0.00141%  and  0.00273%. Therefore,  if  there  is  a  surge  in  consumer  awareness  of  10%,  the 
market share of fair trade coffee will rise of at most 0.273%. In 2004, the average proportion of 
aware consumers was 46% and the average market share 0.77%. If there were a surge of 54% in 
consumer awareness so that the whole population becomes aware, then the average market share 
would at best rise of 1.47% and reach 2.24%. These projections do not take into account the 
possible  decreasing  impact  of  awareness  and  the  interplay  with  other  factors,  but  it  clearly 
appears consumer awareness alone is not making a big difference. 
 
An  interesting  phenomenon  is  world  shops  and  supermarkets  tend  to  be  insignificant  when 
regressed  together.  It  may  be  due  to  the  fact  both  actors  are  competing  and  behaving  like 
substitutes  to  sell  fair  trade  coffee.  In  this  case,  a  high  number  of  world  shops  would  deter 
supermarkets of entering the market and vice versa. The only country, which simultaneously has 
high  levels  of  supermarkets  and  world  shops  is  Switzerland.  One  explanation  could  be  the 
particular  market  structure  of  the  Swiss  retail  sector,  where  the  entrance  of  one  of  the  two 
duopolists (Coop or Migros) compels the other to do the same since both supermarket chains are 
present almost everywhere and consumers can easily switch from one to another.
59 This might 
not be the case in country where there is a higher number of supermarket chains. For example, if 
an average ethical consumer lives in Germany and one supermarket chain starts selling fair trade 
coffee,  the  substitution  phenomena  across  supermarkets  might  be  much  weaker:  if  ten  other 
supermarkets cover the area and are located between his home and the supermarket selling fair 
trade coffee, the probability he ends up shopping in one of the nine others is relatively high.  
 
                                                 
59 A hypothesis close to the one formulated Becchetti, Solferin and Tessitore (2005).  
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Table 3: OLS regressions 
Converging towards the best model 
   OLS_1  OLS_2  OLS_3  OLS_4  OLS_5  OLS_6  OLS_6  OLS_7 
                          
   mktshare mktshare  mktshare  mktshare  mktshare  mktshare  mktshare  mktshare 
awareness  0.141  0.251  0.225  0.154  0.255  0.187  0.273  0.227 
   (0.071)* (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.013)**  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
supermkts  0.467  0.391  0.439  -0.115  0.576  0.048  1.383  0.913 
   -0.315  -0.335  -0.169  -0.731  (0.043)**  -0.858  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
wshops  13.211  16.449  13.815  23.611  7.979  17.513  4.697  11.222 
   -0.214  -0.13  -0.105  (0.007)***  -0.279  (0.014)**  -0.293  (0.013)** 
vol     1.767  1.539  0.182  2.742  1.398  2.603  1.787 
      -0.206  -0.16  -0.861  (0.012)**  -0.132  (0.000)***  (0.004)*** 
vol_2     -3.559  -3.446  -1.773  -4.754  -3.108  -4.403  -3.435 
      (0.050)**  (0.017)**  -0.183  (0.001)***  (0.011)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
marketing        6.045  5.006  5.562  4.615  4.96  4.473 
         (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
price              -0.901  -0.849  -0.639  -0.651 
               (0.011)**  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.001)*** 
coffee_h                    -0.101  -0.083 
                     (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
educ           0.208     0.195     0.122 
            (0.013)**     (0.005)***     (0.006)*** 
d_2004  -0.113  -0.287  -0.287  -0.144  -0.336  -0.199  -0.376  -0.283 
   -0.621  -0.174  (0.085)*  -0.332  (0.023)**  -0.102  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Constant  -0.017  -0.324  -0.47  -2.648  -0.373  -2.423  0.055  -1.3 
   -0.946  -0.254  (0.044)**  (0.004)***  (0.062)*  (0.002)***  -0.693  (0.009)*** 
Observations 26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26 
R-squared  0.423  0.607  0.776  0.846  0.849  0.91  0.949  0.97 
AIC  39.24367  33.28099  20.63254  12.96938  12.39309  0.9547155 -13.71047  -23.51848 
BIC  45.53415  42.08767  30.69732  24.29224  23.71595  13.53568  -1.129508  -8.421324 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity on OLS_7 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of mktshare 
chi2(1)      =     0.90 
Prob > chi2  =   0.3416, so we cannot reject Ho. 
 
To fix the simultaneous insignificance of world shops and supermarkets, it is possible to exclude 
one actor, to add up both into one variable representing the total number of shops or to modify 
the set of independent variables selling fair trade coffee. Excluding one of the actors or summing 
up both variables into a variable representing the total number of shops selling fair trade coffee 
would make it impossible to differentiate the individual impact of each of these actors, which is 
the interesting part of the exercise.  
 
Coefficients on both variables are positive, but not always significant and their magnitude vary 
quite a lot. It however appears world shops have an impact on fair trade coffee market share that  
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is  around  10  times  stronger  than  that  of  supermarkets.  In  the  last  regression  where  both 
coefficients are significant, the impact of world shops is estimated to be 12.29 times stronger. 
The absolute number of supermarkets is of course higher, but it is interesting to see one world 
shop is selling more fair trade coffee than 12 supermarkets.  
 
Volunteers appear to be significant, although not in all regressions. Signs on both coefficients 
show the impact of volunteers decreases as their number increases. Isolating volunteers from the 
rest of the variables in regression 7:  
 
mktshare = 1.787 vol + -3.435 vol_2 + … 
 
This  implies  volunteers  have  a  negative  impact  on  market  share  once  a  threshold  of  0.52 
volunteers per 1000 inhabitants is reached. It concerns Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, 
which are all stagnating markets. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that a high number of 
volunteers maintains a higher degree of amateurism. 
 
Marketing expenditure of fair trade organizations are always significant and have the expected 
positive sign. According to regression 7, if these expenditures increase of 1 Euro per inhabitant, 
market share would rise of 4.473%. Considering average marketing expenditures were of 0.055 
Euros in 2004, doubling the marketing budget of fair trade organization would increase market 
share by 0.492%. According to this estimation, marketing seems to be a rather efficient tool to 
increase  market  shares  and  it  would  be  interesting  to  compare  the  impact  of  marketing 
expenditures  of  fair  trade  organizations  with  that  of  supermarkets  to  see  if  their  marketing 
strategies are focused on similar objectives. 
 
The coefficient on price is significant and negative as expected. Its magnitude is less than one,  
-0.651  in  regression  7.  It  means  the  demand  is  rather  inelastic,  consumers  being  less  than 
proportionally sensitive to change in prices.
 60 Price could explain a difference of up to 0.39% in 
market shares. 
                                                 
60 Maizel and al. estimated it for several countries in 1988 and found values ranging  
from 0 to -0.3 (cited in ICO (2001)).  
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Per capita coffee consumption is significant with the expected negative sign too. This might hint 
to the two facts mentioned earlier: more than half of coffee is consumed in the out-of-home 
market fair trade has not yet infiltrated, and powerful brands may be more willing to defend their 
market  shares  in  markets  where  per  capita  consumption  is  high.  Considering  per  capita 
consumption varies form 2.4 kg to 11.94 kg and the estimated coefficient in regression 7 is of  
-0.083, it could explain a difference of up to 0.79% in market shares.  
 
Education has the expected positive sign. All consumer studies have found educated people tend 
to be better fair trade consumers. Considering the average years of schooling varies from 10 to 
13.8, the coefficient of 0.122 in regression 7 implies education could explain a difference of up to 
0.46% in market shares. Income also proved a determining factor in consumer studies, but GDP 
per capita proved insignificant at the aggregate level and does not appear in the regressions. 
 
The time dummy variable is significant. Since there are only two years, the dummy acts as a kind 
of test indicating there is a structural change. It highlights some relevant variables are omitted in 
the model, but the negative sign cannot be interpreted as if the impact of determinants on market 
shares were decreasing with time. 
 
Another interesting point is coefficients of world shops and supermarkets seem to be influenced 
by the set of other independent variables. The introduction of education increases the coefficient 
on  world  shops  whereas  the  introduction  of  price  and  per  capita  consumption  increase  the 
coefficient of supermarkets. This underscores the fact these results have to be taken with caution. 
 
Results  of  regressions  integrating  group  dummies  are  shown  in  table  11  in  appendix.  The 
question is the following: what meaningful criterion can be used to regroup countries and be 
significantly integrated in the model? In the present case, classification of countries according to 
size (small, medium and big countries), or culture (Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, Latin and Germanic) 
doesn’t work. Classifying observations (a country can jump from on category to another from 
year to year) according to the level of awareness (0-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-100%) is 
significant but the pattern of coefficients is not linear. Classifying countries (not observations) 
according  to  the  increase  of  awareness  percentage  point  (0-8,  9-15,  16-24,  25-30,  31-100)  
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between 2001 and 2004 to form five different groups of countries is significant, too. This also 




Source:ICO, FINE and NIs. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the pattern of the coefficients of the dummies of regression Dummmies_4. An 
intuitive interpretation leading to the hypothesis (examined hereafter) there is a clean-washing 
phenomenon would be the following: countries start with a very low awareness increase. It then 
jumps brutally to the right when supermarkets enter the game. Market shares however are sticky. 
From then on, awareness continues to increase, but less and less. During this process, market 
shares increase a little bit. This reasoning is based on intuition. What can be said is there exists no 
simple way to set up relevant categories of countries in this context. 
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4.3.5. Testing H2: Are supermarkets clean-washing their hands in the fair trade business? 
4.3.5.1. Treatment regression model 
 
A treatment regression model is used to correct for the sample selection bias and to show indirect 
effects. This procedure will enable us to test the clean-washing hypothesis. As explained above, 
countries have been selected according to criteria that exclude those which are not well organized 
yet. It is likely countries, which already have a high level of awareness or countries where there 
has  been  a  surge  in  awareness  that  are  more  likely  to  be  selected.  This  can  lead  to  an 
overestimation/underestimation of the effect of some variables and it is better to use a treatment 
regression model to take this bias into account. The general form of a two-equations simultaneous 
treatment regression model can be expressed like this: 
 
yi =  1 + x'  + µi (i) with x =
x11 x12 ... d1
x21 x22 ... d2
... ... ... ...














x11 x12 ... z1m
x21 x22 ... z2m
... ... ... ...













di =  2 + z'  + i, (ii) and a covariance matrix of the following form










where (i) is a standard equation with a continuous dependent variable, independent variables (xi) 
among which there is a particular dummy (d). This dummy stands for a continuous determinant 
that has been binarized according to a discretionary threshold. This dummy is simultaneously 
estimated in a probit equation. The independent variables of equation (ii) can be the same as 
those of (i). It is advised to include at least one variable that is not present in the first equation 
(zi). The error term vectors u and v are assumed to be normally distributed, with zero mean and 
correlated to each other.    takes a value between 0 and 1, which can be positive or negative. If 
   is close to 0, the simultaneous approach is considered inappropriate. If the sign is positive, it 
means a separate estimation of both equations would lead to an overestimation of the effect of the 
dummy in (i); the opposite if the sign on    is negative.    actually tests the relevance of the 
procedure. It is the diagnostic and the fix at the same time.  
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A system of this form can be estimated by maximum likelihood or by a two-step procedure (used 
in the next section). If some variables are significant in both equations, it also allows to compute 
marginal  effects,  taking  into  account  the  direct and  indirect  impact  of  independent  variables 
through the dummy variable. For example, if the outcome coefficient is beta and the selection 
coefficient is delta, then  
 
dE[y| d*>0]/dx = beta - (alpha*rho*sigma*delta(alpha)) 
 
where delta(alpha) = inverse Mills' ratio *(inverse Mills' ratio * selection prediction)
61. It can 
therefore provide a better picture of the global impact of factors that may act through multiple 
channels. In this section however, the regressors will prove not to be significant simultaneously 
in both equations, thus it won’t be necessary to compute marginal effects.
62 
 
There are two intermediary steps to move from an OLS model to a treatment regression model. 
First, it is necessary to find a factor that captures the selection bias and make a dummy out of it. 
Since the hypothesis to test is the existence of a “clean-washing” phenomenon, the choice of the 
percentage point increase of awareness as the variable to binarize is obvious. Countries where 
supermarkets  start  commercializing  fair  trade  products  usually  experience  a  strong  rise  in 
awareness.  Fair  trade  organizations  and  supermarkets  are  then  eager  to  make  this  rise  in 
consumer  awareness  public  and  show  how  they  actively  participate  to  this  consumerist 
revolution. They publish these numbers. Countries where this happens are therefore more likely 
to be in the sample and the effect of supermarkets is likely to be overestimated. How to chose a 
threshold able to deal with this bias? 0.24 is chosen as a threshold because it fits our assumption: 
countries  above  it  (Belgium,  Sweden  and  Ireland)  are  newcomers  and  mainstream 
commercialization is recent in France. 
 
The second step consists in looking for factors explaining the dummy variable. The increase in 
awareness is estimated by probit in the two last regressions of table 12 in appendix. It appears 
supermarkets and the number of fair trade products are the most significant variables to explain 
                                                 
61 http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2003-08/msg00570.html 
62 In the part treating awareness level, world shops are significant in both equations, but there are 
too few observations for marginal effects to differ from the traditional coefficients.  
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d_aw24100.  World  shops  and  even marketing  do  not  seem  to  explain  the  dummy. The  best 
relation it is possible to get is Probit 5. Omitted variables like media coverage or supermarket 
marketing expenditures would probably play an important role in this situation. 
 
4.3.5.2. Results and interpretation 
 
When both equations are estimated in a simultaneous system, it gives the results exposed in table 
4.  The  simultaneous  estimation  slightly  deforms  the  model. The  absolute  value  of rho  >  0.5 
indicates  it  is  relevant  to  make  a  simultaneous  estimation.  Coefficients  on  supermarkets  and 
volunteers become insignificant with wrong signs. When volunteers are dropped, supermarkets 
remain insignificant in the main equation, while the variable is significant in the probit equation. 
This hints to the fact supermarkets may have no direct impact, but an influence that is mainly 
channelled  through  awareness  increase.  The  significant  coefficient  and  negative  sign  of 
supermarkets in the auxiliary regressions mean supermarkets happen to be few where awareness 
increases a lot. The increase in awareness is also more loosely positively linked to the number of 
fair  trade  products  commercialized.  This  increase  in  awareness  however  is  not  a  booster  for 
market  shares. The  coefficient  of  d_aw24100  is  significant  and  its  sign  negative in  all  three 
regressions. Its magnitude between -0.77 and -0.499 means an awareness increase of more than 
24% happens in countries where market shares are in average 0.49% to 0.77% lower.  
 
Other interesting interpretations can be derived from these regressions. Once the selection bias is 
taken into account, it appears world shops may have an impact on market shares between 1.6 to 
1.2 stronger than estimated before. Marketing is almost significant in the second regression and 
significant in the third, but its coefficient is less than half of the coefficient estimated previously 
in  OLS  regressions.  Price  and  per  capita  coffee  consumption  are  stable  and  the  impact  of 
education appears around twice stronger than before. 
 
Supermarkets of course have a positive impact on fair trade coffee market shares. They probably 
account for about half of market shares, because supermarkets dominate the retail sector. Looking 
closer at that impact however, it appears, first, that the direct impact of supermarkets on market 
shares is very weak, more than ten times weaker than that of world shops. Second, taking into  
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account the selection bias, the indirect effect through the increase of awareness seems to be the 
only one that holds. If supermarkets have no independent effect on the increase of market shares, 
it is possible to think the recent fair trade mini-boom is a temporary trend that will soon be 
exhausted.  
 




   Treatment_1  Treatment_2  Treatment_3 
                    
   mktshare  d_aw24100 mktshare  d_aw24100 mktshare  d_aw24100 
supermkts  -0.645  -10.899  -0.168  -10.899     -10.899 
   -0.271  (0.051)*  -0.729  (0.051)*     (0.051)* 
wshops  31.306     19.639    19.792    
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
vol  -1.393              
   -0.196                
vol_2  0.72              
   -0.559                
marketing  2.327     2.444    2.697    
   -0.208     -0.119     (0.059)*    
price  -0.669     -0.788    -0.747    
   (0.078)*     (0.017)**     (0.014)**    
coffee_h  -0.056     -0.07    -0.075    
   (0.055)*     (0.010)***  (0.002)*** 
educ  0.251     0.228    0.222    
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
d_2004  0.157  1.026  0.14  1.026  0.133  1.026 
   -0.231  -0.211  -0.224  -0.211  -0.225  -0.211 
d_aw24100  -0.77     -0.567    -0.499    
   (0.046)**     (0.082)*     (0.051)*    
ft_products     -0.131    -0.131     -0.131 
      -0.16     -0.16     -0.16 
Constant  -1.672  1.566  -1.597  1.566  -1.575  1.566 
   (0.061)*  (0.055)*  (0.064)*  (0.055)*  (0.075)*  (0.055)* 
Observations  26  26  26  26  26  26 
 rho  1     0.91249     0.81201    
sigma     0.3250233     0.2875689     0.27736252   
lambda   .2283871 0.44399704    0.26240313    0.2252209    
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The fact that it is through a small number of supermarkets awareness in increasing a lot without a 
significant  impact  on  market  shares  brings  some  support  to  the  hypothesis  supermarkets  are 
clean-washing their hands in the fair trade business: supermarkets claim to help poor producers 
through consumer awareness raising, but since consumer awareness raising does not help poor 
producers what supermarkets are doing is, first, to raise consumer awareness that supermarkets 
distribute  Fairtrade  products  and,  second,  to  strengthen  the  illusion  they  are  helping  poor 
producers. The skilful commercial use of concepts that originally have an ethical meaning is 
capturing  the  attention  of  consumers.  If  we  assume  messages  tend  to  be  associated  to  the 
messenger in people’s minds, then positive values and feelings associated to Fairtrade coffee will 
be associate with supermarkets selling it in consumers minds.  
 
The process can be summarized in two steps. In a first step, a few supermarkets start to sell small 
quantities of fair trade coffee, while proclaiming they are entering a new era of good business 
practices, ethics being taken into account for their future strategies, etc. This is a very positive 
public  relation  operation  with  little  effect  on  market  shares.  In  a  second  step,  competing 
supermarket  chains  also  want  to  profit  from  this  opportunity  to  promote  their  image  as 
responsible social stakeholder and start to sell fair trade coffee. As this phenomenon goes on, the 
number of supermarkets increases and the proportion of the population susceptible to be reached 
by the message of fair trade slowly reaches its maximum: awareness stalls. At this point, market 
shares stall too or even decrease. After the ethical peak, fair trade will jump the shark.
63  
 
Figure 10 shows there is a big increase in public awareness when a few supermarkets enter the 
market, and this increase gets smaller as more and more supermarkets enter the market to profit 
from the reputation effect. After this fairness bath, supermarkets can pretend to have tried all they 
                                                 
63 “Jumping the shark is a metaphor that has been used by US TV critics and fans to denote the 
tipping point at which a TV series is deemed to have passed its peak. Once a show has "jumped 
the shark," fans sense a noticeable decline in quality or feel the show has undergone too many 
changes to retain its original charm. The phrase specifically arises from a scene in the hit TV 
comedy series Happy Days in which one of the central characters, Arthur "The Fonz" Fonzarelli, 
on water skis, literally jumps over a shark. The scene was written into the show at a point when 
the viewing ratings were beginning to drop, and it is generally regarded as the creative low-point 
at which the show finally lost all credibility. A show may continue well after the point when fans 
feel it has "jumped the shark" but will likely decline in popularity.” Definition taken from 
http://en.wikipedia.org, see also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpraJYnbVtE.  
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could do to promote fairness, to have done their part of the job: they have put FairTrade coffee on 




Source: FINE and NIs 
 
The problem is this will not solve the coffee crisis. Supermarkets can argue consumers have to be 
blamed for the failure of the fair trade utopia and it is the propensity of consumers to greedily 
maximize utility that has thwarted the project to introduce ethics into daily life. Consumers can 
blame politicians for their incompetence in dealing with global poverty issues like the one of 
coffee  producers.  Politicians  can  blame  multinationals  or  supermarkets  chains  for  not  caring 
enough about externalities generated by their activities. Nobody will seriously listen to producers 
anyway.  To  make  it  short,  there  seems  to  be  a  systemic  problem:  the  old  invisible  hand  is 
suffering from arthritis once again. Meanwhile, supermarkets are washing theirs in the fair trade 
business.  
 
Results of regressions treating the selection bias arising from high level of awareness are shown 
in table 13. The threshold of the dummy is set at 42% awareness, but it could be higher too.
64 
Absolute values of rho are close to 0.5. The interpretation of estimated coefficients is similar to 
                                                 
64 To find the threshold, the initial assumption is there is a bias in the selection of observations 
that favors those with a high level of awareness as explained under4.3.3. The choice of 42 % is 
not the result of a reasoning like for the treatment on awareness increase, but of a process of trials 
and errors to find a significant relationship. The threshold is quite close to the average level of 
awareness over the two periods, which is of 37.6%.  
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that made for regression OLS 7, but there are some differences. Education drops from the main 
equation, but world shops are significant at 11% in the two first regressions. The coefficient on 
the treatment dummy is positive and means observations with a high level of awareness have 
around 0.7% more market share and that the probability to have a high level of awareness is 
positively influenced by the number of world shops and education.  
 
The econometric results of this paper are based on data available in small quantity. Important 
variables are omitted. It is therefore recommended to debate their validity and pursue further 
investigations. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The second section of this paper has summarized known facts about the new equilibrium reached 
in the coffee industry after the fall of the ICA and the problems it has sharpened. The fall of the 
coffee price is decreasing the income of 25 millions coffee producers and indirectly affecting 125 
millions of people. Section three has explained what the fair trade system is and how it works. It 
has shown FLO is the only private labelling initiative, which is able to somewhat loosen the 
fairness versus efficiency trade-off through an imaginative financial scheme. Section four has 
however made clear fair trade is not a tool suited to tackle issues of the size of the coffee crisis.  
 
Additionally, OLS regressions of section four have put in evidence consumer awareness is not 
making  a  difference  and  treatment  regressions  support  the  hypothesis  fair  trade  is  used  by 
supermarkets  to  clean-wash  their  reputation.  Fair  trade  is  assaulted  from  outside  by  pseudo-
socially-concerned  labelling  initiatives  aimed  at  confusing  consumers.  But  the  decision  of 
alternative trade to go mainstream and develop into fair trade is also endangering itself from 
within. Big players like Procter & Gamble, Starbucks, Nestlé, Tesco, Carrefour and others have 
started to buy small quantities of FairTrade certified coffee making it even more difficult for 
consumers to know who is doing what.  
 
The  general  impression  everybody  is  becoming  fair  represents  a  threat  for  the  fair  trade 
movement.  If  the  notion  of  fairness  is  not  more  precisely  defined,  legally  protected  or  fair 
premium are not institutionalized at an industry-wide level, then fair trade will not be able to 
defend itself against more competitive business concepts. 
 
Different ideas exist within the fair trade movement about how to strengthen it and guarantee its 
survival. Merging with other initiatives proved impossible, but some want to merge the FTO 
label with the FLO label, so as to label organizations and their products simultaneously. Some 
want to give FINE more power, but do not agree on how to do it. Some think “more of the same” 
is the solution and believe consumer and youth education in particular is the solution. The fair 
trade movement is also leading political advocacy to advance its cause. Strong relationships exist  
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with UNCTAD and some leaders in African countries
65. Fair trade has been making its way into 
European institutions through the advocacy work of EFTA and FINE. The European Parliament 
has  recently  called  on  to  the  Commission  to  issue  a  non-binding  recommendation  and  to 
undertake a study to examine how fair trade could develop into a model for sustainable trade 
policy,  which  would  be  capable  of  stimulating  balanced  North-South  trade,  and  identify  the 
obstacles to trade which impact most seriously on the world's poor.
66  
 
The problem of all these efforts is they are trapped in the unilateral premise of fair trade. The 
coffee  crisis  is  a  systemic  issue  that  cannot  be  solved  by  isolated  initiatives.  Fair  trade  can 
disappear or conquer slightly larger market shares, but it does not represent a sufficient answer to 
the  coffee  crisis.  Actually,  a  solution  to  this  problem  does  not  exist  yet.  A  political  will  to 
seriously  tackle  this  issue  does  not  exist  yet.  States  have  abandoned  their  regulatory  power. 
Private actors among traders, roasters and retailers do not have the power to unilaterally modify 
the equilibrium of the market. As a group however these actors could create rules that affect the 
whole industry. Actually, they already do. The Common Code for the Coffee Community, which 
is the initiative gathering the most important actors of the coffee industry is expressing these 
rules: those who care about sustainability, fairness or anything of that kind are free to do so, free-
riding is allowed too. Fair trade is developing in this anarchy, but neither does it diminish it 
substantially, nor does it put an end to it. Facing difficulties to extend their principles, leaders of 
fair trade and producer organizations are probably resigned to remain a niche market for a limited 
number  of  coffee  growers  and  to  expand  it  as  much  as  possible.  Supportive  consumers  are 




                                                 
65 Fair trade is mentioned in the Cotonou agreement in 2000 (article 1-5 of appendix V of the 
convention) between The European Union and the ACP countries. The idea has been proposed 
that fair trade products benefits from a preferential treatment (GSP). This would not affect coffee 
trade since the import tax of unprocessed coffee is already 0%, but it would affect the trade of 
banana and honey for example. See appendix 6 of Belgian Science Policy in collaboration with 
the Université de Liège (2005) for more details. 
66 Appendix 5 of Belgian Science Policy in collaboration with the Université de Liège (2005), 
and http://www.noticias.info/Asp/aspComunicados.asp?nid=198561 (06.07.2006).  
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6. APPENDIX 
 
Table 5: Illustration of the diversity of organization size 
 




Table 6: Price break-up  
  
  54 
   




Table 7: List of selected countries and the selection bias 
 
Countries able    Countries excluded      Countries excluded 
to provide  from the sample   for other reasons 
awareness statistics  because they could    
   not provide    
   awareness statistics    
Austria  Spain  USA 
Beligium  Portugal  Canada 
Denmark  Malta  Japan 
Finland  Czech Republic  Luxemburg 
France  Greece    
Germany  Hungary    
Ireland  Latvia    
Italy  Lithuania    
The Netherlands  Slovakia    
Norway  Slovenia    
Sweden       
Switzerland       
UK       
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    mktshare |        26    .7057692    .5699556        .05       1.95 
   awareness |        26    376.5385    193.4103         60        850 
   supermkts |        26    .2273951    .2166242    .012364   .8861321 
      wshops |        26    .0108004    .0121619          0    .041511 
         vol |        26    .2955277    .2708574   .0185151   .8019831 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   marketing |        26    .0515849     .042571   .0036488   .1686431 
       price |        26    .3061538    .1938881        .12        .75 
    coffee_h |        26    6.818077    2.583495       2.22      11.94 
        educ |        26    12.40769    1.034958         10       13.8 




Table 9: Correlations 
 
             | mktshare superm~s   wshops      vol market~g    price coffee_h     educ ft_pro~s  
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    mktshare |   1.0000 
   supermkts |   0.0522   1.0000 
      wshops |   0.5465  -0.1044   1.0000 
         vol |   0.2154  -0.1681   0.6682   1.0000 
   marketing |   0.5893  -0.1111   0.3463   0.3490   1.0000 
       price |  -0.2227   0.1511  -0.0500   0.1314  -0.0809   1.0000 
    coffee_h |  -0.2840   0.6633  -0.1005  -0.0093  -0.1503   0.3095   1.0000 
        educ |   0.4355   0.4812  -0.0887   0.0369   0.1654   0.2051   0.1832   1.0000 
 ft_products |   0.4793  -0.0637   0.0975   0.1196   0.5942   0.1898  -0.1639   0.1596   1.0000 
   d_aw24100 |  -0.2812  -0.4694  -0.1036   0.0241  -0.1920  -0.1794  -0.2738  -0.2350  -0.2495    
      d_aw42 |   0.5177  -0.0856   0.4186   0.2644   0.1119  -0.0687   0.0311   0.2850   0.1713     
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Table 10: Data set 
 
country  year  d_2004  mktshare  awareness  supermkts  wshops  vol  marketing  price 
Austria  2004  1  0.54  300  0.245942  0.0122971  0.4426955  0.0859567  0.2 
Austria  2001  0  0.37  230  0.17737  0.008318  0.440367  0.0464832  0.2 
Belgium  2004  1  0.38  660  0.068047  0.028677  0.8019831  0.0553125  0.2 
Belgium  2001  0  0.33  360  0.1009712  0.0240408  0.7933455  0.1221271  0.2 
Denmark  2004  1  0.81  460  0.186602  0.0011196  0.0186602  0.0983392  0.2 
Denmark  2001  0  1.07  430  0.4573227  0.0027773  0.0185151  0.0573968  0.2 
Finland  2004  1  0.17  350  0.5782575  0.0048188  0.1156515  0.0578258  0.75 
Finland  2001  0  0.15  250  0.4131599  0.0057383  0.1147666  0.03443  0.75 
France  2004  1  0.76  510  0.1685715  0.0027814  0.0421429  0.0248306  0.17 
France  2001  0  0.23  240  0.0400332  0.0014618  0.0415282  0.008804  0.17 
Germany  2004  1  0.28  420  0.2795435  0.0097233  0.6077033  0.030215  0.7 
Germany  2001  0  0.34  410  0.2339649  0.0084858  0.6061267  0.0157593  0.7 
ireland  2004  1  0.79  440  0.0649857  0.0015597  0.1039771  0.0202755  0.3 
ireland  2001  0  0.57  160  0.012364  0.0066766  0.098912  0.0420376  0.3 
Italy  2004  1  0.05  300  0.0697496  0.0087187  0.0261561  0.0036619  0.15 
Italy  2001  0  0.11  230  0.0455233  0.0064984  0.0260629  0.0036488  0.15 
The Netherlands  2004  1  1.5  850  0.1931946  0.0256762  0.7478499  0.0466783  0.24 
The Netherlands  2001  0  1.8  740  0.1351766  0.0245776  0.7373272  0.13702  0.24 
Norway  2004  1  0.85  180  0.8861321  0  0.1063358  0.0239256  0.12 
Norway  2001  0  0.42  60  0.6533101  0  0.1045296  0.0174216  0.12 
Sweden  2004  1  0.41  470  0.0843076  0.0039344  0.2810252  0.0097797  0.35 
Sweden  2001  0  0.29  130  0.0833889  0.0024461  0.2779631  0.0333556  0.35 
Switzerland  2004  1  1.95  640  0.345925  0.041511  0.401273  0.0907707  0.3 
Switzerland  2001  0  1.73  420  0.2841294  0.0405899  0.3923691  0.0568259  0.3 
UK  2004  1  1.62  390  0.0524419  0.0016917  0.1691675  0.1686431  0.3 
UK  2001  0  0.83  160  0.0518585  0.0066914  0.1672856  0.0496838  0.3 
country  year  coffee_h  educ  ft_products  ftc_years  gdp_h  d_aw42  d_aw24100   
Austria  2004  7.59  11.8  14  12  33001  0  0    
Austria  2001  7.83  11.8  6  9  31625  0  0    
Belgium  2004  8.08  11.3  9  8  31740  1  1    
Belgium  2001  5.52  11.3  5  5  30370  0  1    
Denmark  2004  9.42  13.6  10  10  32361  1  0    
Denmark  2001  9.66  13.6  6  7  31697  1  0    
Finland  2004  11.94  12.1  12  6  31554  0  0    
Finland  2001  11.01  12.1  8  3  29290  0  0    
France  2004  5.02  11.5  9  13  31952  1  1    
France  2001  5.31  11.5  3  10  30622  0  1    
Germany  2004  7.4  13.4  9  12  29583  1  0    
Germany  2001  6.9  13.4  8  9  29196  0  0    
ireland  2004  3.22  12.9  9  9  38050  1  1    
ireland  2001  2.3  12.9  3  6  34038  0  1    
Italy  2004  5.58  10  5  10  28710  0  0    
Italy  2001  5.44  10  4  7  28280  0  0    
The Netherlands  2004  5.89  12.9  12  17  32393  1  0    
The Netherlands  2001  6.47  12.9  8  14  32463  1  0    
Norway  2004  9.27  13.8  7  7  40598  0  0    
Norway  2001  9.46  13.8  3  4  39128  0  0    
Sweden  2004  8.28  12.5  12  8  31842  1  1    
Sweden  2001  8.49  12.5  5  5  29751  0  1    
Switzerland  2004  5.77  12.8  13  13  35023  1  0    
Switzerland  2001  6.8  12.8  8  10  34966  1  0    
UK  2004  2.4  12.7  26  11  32414  0  0    
UK  2001  2.22  12.7  10  8  30391  0  0    
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Table 11: OLS regressions with dummies groups (awareness level and awareness increase) 
 
   Awareness level 
  
Awareness increase 
   Dummies_1  Dummies_2       Dummies_3 Dummies_4 
                   
   mktshare  mktshare        mktshare  mktshare 
awareness  0.192  0.187    awareness  0.218  0.226 
   (0.001)***  (0.000)***       (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
supermkts  0.89  0.86    supermkts  0.576  0.575 
   (0.051)*  (0.032)**       (0.077)*  (0.056)* 
wshops  8.893       wshops  9.212    
   -0.427          (0.089)*    
vol  2.562  4.694    vol  1.602  2.193 
   -0.357  (0.000)***       (0.009)***  (0.009)*** 
vol_2  -4.936  -8.619    vol_2  -3.121  -3.219 
   -0.311  (0.000)***       (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
marketing  4.386  3.727    marketing  3.649  3.746 
   (0.003)***  (0.000)***       (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
price  -0.476  -0.35    price  -0.731  -0.928 
   -0.12  -0.143       (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
coffee_h  -0.081  -0.104    coffee_h  -0.074    
   (0.024)**  (0.000)***       (0.016)**    
educ  0.023       educ  0.133    
   -0.783          (0.004)***    
aw_e010  -0.249  -1.228    d_aw08  -0.181  -0.608 
   -0.847  (0.028)**       -0.315  (0.001)*** 
aw_e1020  -0.347  -1.506    d_aw15  -0.014  -0.448 
   -0.818  (0.017)**       -0.939  (0.024)** 
aw_e2030  -0.482  -1.484    d_aw30  -0.245  -0.358 
   -0.713  (0.008)***       -0.1  (0.063)* 
aw_e4050  -0.197  -0.976    d_aw30100  -0.17  -0.726 
   -0.847  (0.027)**       -0.45  (0.001)*** 
aw_e50100  0.328  0.159            
   -0.247  -0.341            
d_2004  -0.221  -0.194    d_2004  -0.249  -0.277 
   (0.040)**  (0.036)**       (0.005)***  (0.011)** 
Constant  0.27  1.61    Constant  -1.193  0.27 
   -0.89  (0.010)***        (0.020)**  -0.257 
Observations  26  26    Observations 26  26 
R-squared  0.982  0.981    R-squared  0.981  0.938 
AIC  -28.95545  -31.1003    AIC  -29.82919  -4.714788 




  F(  3,    14) =    2.42 
  Prob > F =    0.1094  
(we  reject  the  hypothesis  of  the  irrelevance  of  this 
categorization at a 11% level of significance) 
 
d_aw08: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy 
d_aw15: Finland, The Netherlands, Norway 
d_aw24: Switzerland, UK   
d_aw30: France, Ireland   
d_aw30100: Belgium, Sweden 
test  aw_e010=  aw_e1020=  aw_e2030=  aw_e4050 
=aw_e50100 on Dummies_4 
F(  4,    12) =    5.53 
Prob > F =    0.0092 
(we  reject  the  hypothesis  of  the  irrelevance  of  this 










   Probit_1  Probit_2  Probit_3        Probit_4  Probit_5 
                       
   d_aw42  d_aw42  d_aw42        d_aw24100  d_aw24100 
supermkts  -3.036  -2.457  90.319     supermkts  -11.491  -10.899 
   (0.099)*  -0.145  (0.036)**        (0.067)*  (0.051)* 
wshops  263.215  86.291        wshops  -11.864    
   -0.131  (0.043)**           -0.793    
vol  -5.457           marketing  5.336    
   -0.229              -0.651    
educ  1.645  1.135  0.802     ft_products  -0.17  -0.131 
   (0.036)**  (0.029)**  (0.052)*        -0.175  -0.16 
d_2004  2.506  1.84  1.645     d_2004  1.273  1.026 
   (0.054)*  (0.020)**  (0.025)**        -0.209  -0.211 
Constant  -22.236  -15.674  -12.003     Constant  1.67  1.566 
   (0.033)**  (0.020)**  (0.031)**        (0.072)*  (0.055)* 
Observations  26  26  26     Observations  26  26 
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   Treatment_4  Treatment_5  Treatment_6 
                    
   mktshare  d_aw42  mktshare  d_aw42  mktshare  d_aw42 
supermkts  0.852     1.085     1.388    
   (0.029)**     (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
wshops  14.851  90.319  10.173  90.319  5.465  90.319 
   -0.105  (0.036)** -0.106  (0.036)** -0.395  (0.036)** 
vol  0.782     0.735         
   -0.325     -0.312          
vol_2  -1.68     -1.65         
   (0.064)*     (0.050)*          
marketing  5.93     6.383     5.916    
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
price  -0.34              
   -0.149                
coffee_h  -0.091     -0.109     -0.126    
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
educ  0.077  0.802    0.802    0.802 
   -0.435  (0.052)*     (0.052)*     (0.052)* 
d_2004  -0.159  1.645  -0.262  1.645  -0.221  1.645 
   -0.372  (0.025)** (0.055)*  (0.025)** -0.12  (0.025)** 
d_aw42  0.627     0.875     0.749    
   -0.121     (0.001)***  (0.007)*** 
Constant  -0.34  -12.003  0.564  -12.003  0.681  -12.003 
   -0.775  (0.031)** (0.000)***  (0.031)** (0.000)***  (0.031)** 
Observations  26  26  26  26  26  26 
 rho  -0.52423     -0.88303     -0.50346    
sigma     0.2036785     0.23997881     0.2541844    
lambda   .2283871 -0.10677455    -0.21190761    -0.12797138   
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